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Operation "Spring"
An Historian's View
Terry Copp

B

rian McKenna, the author of the infamous
Valour and the Horror television series, is
determined to sell his story of the Black Watch
at Verrieres Ridge to anyone who will buy it. His
recent article in Macleans echoes previous
attempts to convince readers that "Canada's
military establishment, abetted by its official
historians.. .lied to protect reputations and keep
smooth careers." McKenna is equally critical of
non-official professional historians who have
studied the battle. He believes that he is the only
one who has the knowledge and insight to
interpret what happened that day. Why is
McKenna so committed to his mythic version of
events? Part of it is wounded pride over the
negative reaction to his television series but
McKenna is an idealist not a cynic and he
genuinely believes that Major Phillip Griffin
deserves a Victoria Cross for his actions on 25
July 1944.
If McKenna would take the trouble to make
his argument from evidence and avoid personal
attacks he might make a contribution to our
understanding of the battle and the way in which
a w a r d s for valour are m a d e . I n s t e a d he
constructs a story out of half-truths and
hyperbole. McKenna is not alone in his
passionate defence of Griffin. The Black Watch
Veterans Association has always nurtured a
regimental memory which assigns blame to the
generals. When the exact wording for the 2001
memorial plaque for the Canadian Battle of
Normandy Foundation site at Point 67 in
Normandy was under discussion veterans
insisted that Griffin had been ordered to advance
directly over the ridge.
Let us assume the question of responsibility
is still open and examine Brian McKenna's
version of events. McKenna begins with the
statement that the entire Canadian Corps, some

30,000 men, were involved in an offensive that
has "echoes of Vimy Ridge." Operation "Spring"
was a limited, carefully phased attack with three
battalions, less that 1,200 combat troops,
advancing in the first phase and three more
battalions, including the Black Watch, carrying
out a second phase to secure villages on the
reverse slope of the ridge. The second phase
attacks, planned for first light, were to be directly
supported by Canadian armour while two
regiments of the 7th Armoured Division
attempted to advance across the centre of the
ridge. All of this is clearly laid out in the plans
for "Spring" and the message logs demonstrate
that the armoured regiments did their best to
assist the infantry in Phase 2. They were
unsuccessful and suffered heavy losses but
McKenna will not even admit they were involved.
According to McKenna, Lieutenant-General
Guy Simonds, commander of 2nd Canadian
Corps, who was "awkward at deploying tanks
and infantry," held back "the masses of tanks"
he commanded and decreed that "the Black
Watch and 17 other infantry regiments must lead
the breakout."
The Black Watch, McKenna tells us, were
given "a particularly daunting task. The regiment
must scale the ridge and capture the strategic
hamlet of Fontenay-le-Marmion." How exactly
anyone would "scale" the gentle slope of the ridge
which rises just 37 metres over a distance of
1,000 metres is not clear but the original plan
called for the Black Watch to avoid the slope and
attack from a start line on the outskirts of Maysur-Orne.
McKenna's p e n c h a n t for exaggeration
reaches absurdity in his description of the
enemy. The ridge, which in the television series
was held by the 12th SS Hitler Youth Division,
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Major Philip Griffin

The Black Watch casualties in St. Martin
occurred when a single machine gun, bypassed
by the Calgary Highlanders in their night advance

to May-sur-Orne, killed Lieutenant-Colonel
Stuart Cantlie, the Black Watch commanding
officer, and wounded his most experienced
senior officer. This had nothing to do with the
tunnels which were not used for infiltration or
anything else. Though they do make a hell of a
good story.
The best evidence for what happened next
is from an interview with Major Edwin Bennett
conducted by an historical officer on 1 August
1944. Bennett, who was himself killed-in-action
shortly afterward, reported:

is now defended by "four of Hitler's elite SS
Panzer Divisions." The part of the ridge attacked
by the North Novas and Royal Hamilton Light
Infantry was held by 1 SS Panzer Division but
the enemy facing the Black Watch was the 272nd
Infantry Division. Panzer battlegroups were in
reserve to counterattack, but Simonds' intention
was to have his battalions on the their objectives
and dug-in before such attacks could be
mounted.
The dramatization of events presented in the
Valour and the Horror showed German soldiers
racing through concrete-lined tunnels to do
battle with the C a n a d i a n s . McKenna the
journalist knew the mine tunnels under the ridge
did not remotely resemble what he pictured on
television but to a film-maker a picture can be
worth a thousand words whether it is true or
false. McKenna now tells us that in St. Martin
t h e Black Watch were "hit from every
direction...the Germans are infiltrating from a
labyrinth of mining tunnels under the ridge."

Major Griffin's problem was that the battalion
was rather extended. The companies were intact
a n d u n d e r good control b u t the t h r e a t of
dispersion and of possible confusion was near.
Light was breaking and we were under fire from
the ridge. We had j u s t made contact with the
tanks in St. Andre-sur-Orne. They had moved
into the orchard as a harbour and had lost two
tanks coming through the town. Furthermore it
was getting close to H hour for the attack and
the battalion was far from the start line. Soon
the artillery fire would begin and would be of no
value. Major Griffin had to make time to liaise
with the artillery and, if possible, retime their
shoot. He had to get the tank commander into
the picture and make use of his force in any
new plans. Before this could be done, he had to
find out the situation in St. Andre-sur-Orne from
die Camerons of Canada and obtain what reports
he could on the Calgaries and the situation at
May-sur-Orne.
Major Griffin is a brilliant officer of absolutely
outstanding courage and ability. His take-over
in this strained and ticklish situation was
superb. There was no uncertainty whatever in
his actions. He foresaw only a delay, which would
at die outside be two hours, while he rearranged
timings and obtained essential information. The
plan for the attack would be the same as had
been previously set. In the meantime the
battalion was to move to St. Andre-sur-Orne and
occupy the X rds there on Verrieres rd so that
the men would be less obvious targets for the
fire from the left flank and so that a firm base
for ops would be available. So complete was his
control and so well trained the battalion that
this was done at once and in incredibly good
order. All the companies were in their new
positions within 20 minutes of the conclusion
of the "O" Group. Up to this time our casualties,
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This photo shows the gentle slope of Verrieres Ridge, visible in the distance past the town of St. Martin-de-Fontenay.
aside from the three serious losses in leadership,
were slight, a m o u n t i n g to ten or fifteen
altogether.'

McKenna might have u s e d B e n n e t t ' s
interview, which makes no reference to any
change in the approach to the start line, as
evidence that the direct advance was the result
of new orders from on high. Instead he relies on
later recollections and suggests that Griffin only
agreed to any attack because "the honour of the
regiment was at stake."
The contemporary evidence suggests a very
different picture, one that I outline in my 1992
book The Brigade Griffin's actions between 0600
hours and 0930 hours when the Black Watch
attack began, cannot be fully reconstructed.
What is known is that a new artillery fire plan
was agreed upon and tank support arranged with
Major Walter Harris, the commander of "B"
Squadron the First Hussars. 2 The artillery plan
was simply a repetition of the original scheme
to lead the battalion from May to Fontenay but
Griffin decided to move directly to the start line
on a compass bearing rather than by the road
to May. He now wanted the tanks to protect his
right flank rather than the left as in the original
plan, hoping that the advance of the 7 th
Armoured Division would fully occupy the enemy
to the east. At about 0830 hours Griffin made
contact with Lieutenant Michon, commanding
"D" Company of the Calgaries and asked him to
"clear out the factory area." Michon "went
forward to recce to discover very heavy machinegun fire coming from the factory area on the right
and from the knocked out tanks on the high
ground on our left." Michon told Griffin that,
"this was too strong opposition for one company
to clear without artillery support or smoke. He
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then asked me to go forward to see if the Start
Line was secure and to send him word as he
had no information concerning our forward
companies." 3 The Black Watch start line was a
road angling out of May-sur-Orne and Michon
would not agree to recce it for Griffin. He was
unable to contact the other Calgary companies
and when he reported to battalion headquarters
Lieutenant-Colonel D.G. MacLaughlan, the
battalion commander, ordered him to "try and
get forward to the objective." Captain Harrison
and the missing part of "D" Company had arrived
but their attempt to "get forward" to May was
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stopped by an intense m o r t a r b a r r a g e which
caused "very heavy casualties." 4

Griffin had sent a patrol consisting of his
intelligence officer, Lieutenant L.R. Duffield,
Sergeant Benson and one scout to May-sur-Orne.
The patrol moved straight down route 162
"without using the ditches"5 and walked into the
centre of May-sur-Orne without seeing or hearing
any Germans or Calgary Highlanders. At the
crossroads in the centre of the village they turned
left towards the road which marked the battalion
start line. Fifty yards before reaching it they were
fired on by a machine-gun and Duffield returned
to tell Griffin that the Calgaries were not in May
and that the machine-gun would be able to fire
into the flank of the battalion. Griffin's response
was to order Duffield to lead a reinforced patrol,
six men, back to May to "take out" the machinegun.6
Duffield's patrol was not the only force to
visit May-sur-Orne that morning. Major Walter
H a r r i s , c o m m a n d i n g t h e First H u s s a r s
squadron, had listened to divisional and brigade
orders "to go ahead" with Phase II and had sent
one of his four troops forward. This troop
"located some of the Calgary Highlanders in a
hollow north of May, badly cut up and in need of

stretcher bearers, ammunition, etc." Leaving two
tanks to assist the Calgaries, the troop proceeded
to feel its way cautiously into the village. At the
main crossroads the lead tank was holed by an
anti-tank gun and the remaining tank withdrew
to a hull-down position on the north edge of the
village.7
Meanwhile Major Griffin was conferring with
Brigadier W.J. Megill, commander of 5 Brigade,
who had learned through the gunner radio net
that a fire plan, timed for 0930 hours, had been
requested by the Black Watch. Megill recalls that
Griffin was on the verandah of a building on the
forward edge of St. Martin looking outwards
towards May. There did not seem to be any
shelling at that time and Major Griffin calmly
explained his plan. Megill thought it looked like
"a dicey proposition" and suggested that the
Black Watch secure May-sur-Orne first.
According to Megill, Griffin replied that they had
"patrols in May" and he doubted that it was held
on "a continuous basis." Griffin felt sure that if
the Black Watch attack went in, then once it had
passed its start line the Calgary Highlanders
could "fill in behind, on into May-sur-Orne."
Megill accepted this assessment and returned
to his headquarters. 8
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The Black Watch had to move quickly if its
lead companies were to take full advantage of
the timed artillery program. Unfortunately the
Hussars were delayed owing to the narrowness
of the sunken approach road and when the first
tanks arrived at the forming-up place the Black
Watch had already begun to move forward. The
Hussars could still see the infantry moving in
single file with the men close together 9 and the
tanks quickly started across the open ground,
aiming for the gap between May and the ridge
east of the village. Accurate, large-calibre, antitank fire struck the lead tanks immediately and
the others sought dead ground. By 1020 hours
six tanks had been lost and Major Harris
wounded. At least one troop reported reaching
the start line but their tanks were then caught
in enfilade fire from the eastern edge of May.10
The infantry moved in single file, with the
men close together, until they emerged from the
houses and hedgerows of St. Martin. Lieutenant
W.B. Wood, who was wounded by machine-gun

fire before the company started up the hill,
suggests that the men would have been wellspaced out as they moved forward through the
tall grain.'' Three hundred men, spread-out over
a wide area, had little sense of what was
happening around them and the battalion did
not falter. Griffin's plan assumed that the Black
Watch would be able to reach the start-line as
the artillery barrage began. Instead the battalion
was subjected to heavy mortar and machine-gun
fire as it advanced to its start line. When the
survivors reached the crest of the hill the barrage
had passed and the enemy was able to react
quickly.
Captain J o h n Taylor described the advance
in a letter to his father d a t e d 15 A u g u s t 1944:
To begin with I might say that you never need be
ashamed of having belonged to the Black Watch.
We started across country at 0900 hours. By then
the Jerries were thoroughly awake as to what
was going on and from the start we had trouble
from very heavy machine-gunning from the
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flanks, mortars and artillery fire. The troops
were steady as a rock and we kept going. I was
the left forward company and on my right was B
company, then commanded by Sergeant Foam,
all the officers having been knocked out. We
overran two strong points, then I got hit so I
can't be accurate as to the rest of the story but I
understand they got the objective.12

Taylor was w o u n d e d before Griffin a n d
approximately 60 men crossed the crest of the
ridge. One survivor, Private Montreuil, reported
that Captain J o h n Kemp, commanding "D"
Company, urged Major Griffin to call off the
attack but Griffin replied "that the orders were
to attack and that the battalion would therefore
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The mine tower in the "factory" area is visible in this photo taken from the north edge of May-sur-Orne looking north. The
high ground in the background is Point 67. The low, square tower on the right is the church in St. Martin-de-Fontenay.
This photo was taken in 1946.

carry on."13 On top of the ridge the remnant of
the battalion "ran directly into a strong and
exceptionally well camouflaged e n e m y
position."14 Tanks and self-propelled guns were
concealed in haystacks and intense close-range
fire forced the men to ground. Griffin, who may
have been the only officer left, ordered a
withdrawal - "every man to make his way back
as best he could." Not more than 15 soldiers
were able to do so. Griffin's body was later found
"lying among those of his men."15

Lieutenant Leo Dallain, Royal Canadian Army
Medical Corps, went forward into this area
despite mortar and small arms fire. He located
many of the casualties, "organized them into
nests and returned with stretcher-bearers to
evacuate them." The next day, 26 July, heavy
German pressure led the evacuation of all of St.
Martin and Dallain was ordered to cease
attempts to locate further casualties. He was
awarded the Military Cross for this extraordinary
effort.17

The Black Watch suffered 307 casualties on
25 July. Five officers and 118 other ranks were
killed or died of wounds, 101 were wounded and
of the 83 taken prisoner, 21 were wounded. As
the official historian noted, "Except for the
Dieppe operation there is no other instance in
the Second World War when a Canadian battalion
had so many casualties in a single day."16

Can anyone seriously argue that Griffin
should have received a Victoria Cross for leading
his men forward after it was evident that the
enemy held the ridge in strength? Griffin was
young, brave and inexperienced. On the basis
and the information available to him in the early
hours of 25 July he made, or agreed to, a
decision to carry out an ill-considered attack.
Griffin and Megill ought to have stuck to the
original plan, and established a firm base in Mays u r - O r n e before mounting any attack on
Fontenay. If the Watch had helped the Calgaries
and consolidated in May-sur-Orne, Operation
"Spring" would be remembered as a significant
victory and Griffin would have been a nearcertainty for a DSO b u t that is not what
happened.

The battle did not end with the destruction
of the Black Watch. The brigade message log
portrays a scene of confused fighting on the
northern edge of May lasting into the early
afternoon. At 1615 hours a smokescreen was
laid across the front and Brigadier Megill
ordered the Calgaries to withdraw into St. Andre.
Many of the wounded had to be left behind in
the fields to the south and east of St. Martin.
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McKenna concludes his Macleans article
with a gratuitous attack on the integrity of the
late C.P. Stacey and S.F. Wise, two outstanding
h i s t o r i a n s who have m a d e i m p o r t a n t
contributions to our knowledge of Canadian
histoy. McKenna reports that in 1972 C.P. Stacey
wrote to Syd Wise, his s u c c e s s o r at the
Directorate of History, suggesting that a report
on "Spring," written by Guy Simonds, that was
sharply critical of the Black Watch not be shown
to Phil Griffin's brother who was seeking
information about the circumstances of his
brother's death.
The story behind the Simonds report is
worth recalling. When news of the heavy losses
suffered by the Black Watch reached Canada the
regimental seniors and friends demanded
accounting. The Minister of National Defence,
J.L. Ralston asked Stacey to carry out an
investigation of "Spring" and efforts were made
to interview survivors and ensure the relevant
documents were preserved. Stacey provided the
Minister with information about what happened
but offered no adverse comments on anyone.
Simonds paid little attention to this detailed
examination of the evidence contenting himself
with generalizations about the need to clear the
start line. He also offered his much-quoted
statement about "Spring" as a "holding attack"
which Stacey and many other historians since
used in explaining the purpose of the operation.
The Simonds report tells us something about
Guy Simonds but very little about "Spring."
There was nothing new to be learned from it in
1972 and it was not unreasonable for Stacey,
who had preserved the document despite orders
to destroy it, to advise Wise to maintain the
confidential designation which kept the
document from the public until a policy decision
was made to open most records well before the
standard 50 years had passed. Criticizing Wise
is particularly ironic as he and his successor at
the Directorate of History, Dr. Alec Douglas, were
responsible for providing public access to
National Defence records at the earliest possible
date. When I first visited the Directorate in 1981
the Simonds report as well as all the other
documents on "Spring" were readily available
thanks to the effort of these men. We all owe
them an enormous debt and it is time McKenna
apologized.

Are there any lessons to be learned from the
debate between McKenna and the research
historians? In a recent CBC program, aired on
their digital channel, McKenna noted that while
the military and academic establishments
criticized his work the media establishment
always supported him and still does. McKenna
remains CBC's favourite film maker as is evident
from his current project on the Korean War.
The CBC, the media establishment and Brian
McKenna all believe that the story comes first,
incidents that add drama second and the context
a poor third. Information which contradicts or
complicates the thrust of the narrative is to be
ignored and words are used to convey emotion
not precise meaning. In the face of such an
approach all that historians can do is their job
and that means challenging the myth-makers.
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